Crowley, dense articulations, and classroom possibilities

I thought I'd go ahead and post some other sections of my paper that I left off last night. Although I do touch on the "how biased or unbiased is Crowley?" question in this week's presentation, I mainly focused on how many of her ideas--or Mouffe's ideas as taken from Derrida, Foucault, and Edward Said, who I’ll read from later--could be operationalized a bit. While I’m also interested in questioning Crowley's politics or ulterior motives in presenting her “meta-discourse” or self-reflexive rhetoric (and I really liked the questions raised by Mark and Faith on the last two posts on this board--where does Crowley stand beyond what liberals and Apocalyptists do?), I’m also interested in how some of her rhetoric provides concepts for civic discourse (that is, regardless of where Crowley may head in the second half of the book, I'm picking out some of her rhetorical strategies that could aid in a class discussion, a semiotic analysis of a text, a way to consider how "densely articulated" our own belief systems can be, etc).

I also wanted to add that, having grown up among (1oo's, 1,000's?) of fundamentalist Christians--in the shadow of some of their world headquarters--I would agree with Faith and likely all of you that, yes, there's a wide range of beliefs, motivations, and interpretations of why someone follows the tenets of a denomination. On the one hand, I'm glad I grew up among those who lived a Jesus Camp life and those who felt freer to negotiate what their faith might “mean” and how it might best be practiced. Almost by geographical default, I have many friends who are fundamentalist Christians. Having said that--having over-articulated my ethos claim here--I would disagree with what seems like over-generalization when Faith writes:

“a Fundamentalist Christian would never claim to have beliefs as Crowley defines them: ‘views or attitudes . . . that serve the interests of the believer and/or some other person, group, or institution’ (68). Their focus is on a much larger goal, winning souls for Christ, meaning that their life isn't about them. There's a higher purpose. In fact, living for yourself is just about the worst thing you can do.”

I agree that most “would never claim to have beliefs as Crowley defines them,” but I think Crowley would say that this was conjecture on her part (apt or not) and that, no, most would not openly admit or realize that this was the case, though a lack of admission or awareness would not mean that it wasn’t the case. I guess I’m worrying over the perhaps over-generous way in which you’re characterizing “their focus,” since I fail to believe that all fundamentalist Christians “focus on a much larger goal, winning souls for Christ” and that “their life isn’t about them. There’s a higher purpose.” Having said that, I don’t agree with Crowley when she begins to dwell exclusively on the Christian right as those who show “willingness to distort factual evidence to make ideological points” (168)(nor do I celebrate the over-representation of Christian freak shows in the documentaries I mention in the part of my paper I will get to below). I do share some of your irritation with overly smug, thinly veiled and equally hegemonic portraits from some of The Left (as I now over-generalize). I think we’ve mentioned a mutual interest in (the now defunct?) Studio 60, which would have higher ratings if I weren’t on the road most Monday nights, partly because it's interesting to watch Aaron Sorkin try to provide (self-professed) “fair time” to what he still sees as “The Other” (i.e. his sometimes stock Harriet Hayes character).

At any rate, here is more from what I’ll be talking about, CMAP in hand, when we gather this evening. . . .

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At times Crowley’s over-reliance on Chantel Mouffe for any discussion of “an identity such as ‘an American’ depend[ing] upon a rigorous exclusion of . . .competing national identities” seemed to over-credit Mouffe, LaClau et al. for ideas of “difference” and “the Other” easily found in Derrida, Foucault, and Said’s Orientalism (1978, 2002) (72). However, Crowley does cite these famous poststructuralists when she focuses on how hegemonic fixing of identities takes on the social (and bodily) incipience of habitus, and how a “densely articulated ideologic” enters the habitus, “explains everything,” and produces “intense emotional responses” that can rarely be countered (79). At this point Crowley suggests that beliefs new to, or less densely clustered with, commonplace ideologies are at least “relatively open to reception” (79). This put me in mind of Jon Stewart’s skirmishes with pundits on “real news” shows such as Hardball. Stewart’s contention is that these shows do not promote political discourse so much as white noise--easy iterations of densely articulated belief systems, a forum for commonplaces, platitudes, poll-tested talking points, and what Crowley might term the “ringing of chimes” to produce “sympathetic vibrations” (78-79).

The more accessible sections of Crowley’s book could be offered to a Jim-Berlin-caliber, uber-FYC course (or what we might just call Honors Comp). Perhaps a discussion of whether or not Crowley is biased in her depiction of the Christian Right could lead to peripheral points of how limited our language is when we try to avoid biased discourse on liberals or conservatives. Certainly, assertions such as “one function of hegemony and ideology is to create identity, to disguise or hide the flow of difference” would spark debate and abound in post-9/11 media examples: Progress for America’s “Because they want to kill us” ad, primetime dramas such as 24 and Studio 60 whose creators claim equal time for the left and the right (72). If nothing else, portions of Crowley’s argument could lead to the meta-awareness of being in a classroom (the Eden where some want us to lead value-neutral discussions) while debating whether or not we can find a space to offer 1) respect and the potential for justice, 2) the awareness and allowance of emotion, values, and beliefs, and 3) opportunities for discourse modeled on “agonistic pluralism” instead of consensus or a “perceived erosion of values.”