I have no good reason for why I didn't post this until now. But feedback is definitely welcome. It'll be called something like "Fantasy Theme Analysis and Invention as a Social Act." Maybe.
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Symbolic convergence theory suggests that people come to share consciousness about their worlds by sharing symbolic material such as stories, jokes, analogies, etc. Shared meanings give a group its purpose and identity thereby allowing them to reach consensus and achieve true unity. In short, symbolic convergence allows people to share worldviews. Ernest Bormann first noticed and explicated the phenomena while examining small group communication but quickly expanded the theory to apply to rhetorical criticism. Bormann’s colleagues Donald Shields and John Cragan also made careers out of applying and expanding the concept. Scholarly research has demonstrated that fantasy-theme analysis, which is the primary means for studying symbolic convergence theory, is particularly useful for examining how group members communicate with each other and with those that they are trying to persuade.
Joshua Gunn is perhaps the most vocal opponents of symbolic convergence theory and fantasy theme analysis. He’s gone back and forth with Bormann and Bormann’s colleague’s on the pages of the Quarterly Journal of Speech about the merits and inadequacies of this particular communication theory. One of the aspects of the theory that is most often is disputed is the degree to which people actually share dramatized narratives (fantasies) and “chain” their ideas and experiences among one another. Some have gone so far as to question whether the existing examples of fantasy theme analysis are truly indicators of collective action, or just evidence of the work of a few individuals. These objections seriously question the integrity of symbolic convergence theory, which I believe still has plenty of potential for explaining human interaction. Therefore, I’d like to rescue the theory from its detractors.
In my paper I will strengthen symbolic convergence theory by introducing the idea of rhetorical invention, which ought to be familiar to any and all serious rhetoricians. Karen LeFevre has argued that invention is a social act. Writers such as George Herbert Mead and Emile Durkheim have suggested that all rhetorical invention is a result of social processes. Therefore, a theory of (social) invention can expand the way scholars think about symbolic convergence. Symbolic convergence happens in places other than just small groups. Anytime people share ideas, or ideas can be demonstrated to permeate the consciousness of a particular group of thinkers, I would argue that symbolic convergence has occurred. Definitions of symbolic convergence need to be expanded in order to accommodate important theories of rhetorical invention. Some types of convergence are perhaps less direct than what was originally posited, but they are nonetheless forms of convergence.
In conclusion, symbolic convergence theory was once an exciting new idea in communication and rhetorical studies. However, serious criticisms of its validity have injured the theory’s reputation. There is absolutely no doubt that fantasy theme analysis has fallen out of favor with communication scholars and rhetorical critics. These ideas are not used or published as often as they once were. However, an understanding of invention as a social act can significantly bolster a symbolic convergence theory by understanding the way the social is responsible for the creation of all knowledge and therefore all symbolic material. This can free up the theory and the primary means for studying the theory (fantasy theme analysis) for use once again.
Joshua Gunn is perhaps the most vocal opponents of symbolic convergence theory and fantasy theme analysis. He’s gone back and forth with Bormann and Bormann’s colleague’s on the pages of the Quarterly Journal of Speech about the merits and inadequacies of this particular communication theory. One of the aspects of the theory that is most often is disputed is the degree to which people actually share dramatized narratives (fantasies) and “chain” their ideas and experiences among one another. Some have gone so far as to question whether the existing examples of fantasy theme analysis are truly indicators of collective action, or just evidence of the work of a few individuals. These objections seriously question the integrity of symbolic convergence theory, which I believe still has plenty of potential for explaining human interaction. Therefore, I’d like to rescue the theory from its detractors.
In my paper I will strengthen symbolic convergence theory by introducing the idea of rhetorical invention, which ought to be familiar to any and all serious rhetoricians. Karen LeFevre has argued that invention is a social act. Writers such as George Herbert Mead and Emile Durkheim have suggested that all rhetorical invention is a result of social processes. Therefore, a theory of (social) invention can expand the way scholars think about symbolic convergence. Symbolic convergence happens in places other than just small groups. Anytime people share ideas, or ideas can be demonstrated to permeate the consciousness of a particular group of thinkers, I would argue that symbolic convergence has occurred. Definitions of symbolic convergence need to be expanded in order to accommodate important theories of rhetorical invention. Some types of convergence are perhaps less direct than what was originally posited, but they are nonetheless forms of convergence.
In conclusion, symbolic convergence theory was once an exciting new idea in communication and rhetorical studies. However, serious criticisms of its validity have injured the theory’s reputation. There is absolutely no doubt that fantasy theme analysis has fallen out of favor with communication scholars and rhetorical critics. These ideas are not used or published as often as they once were. However, an understanding of invention as a social act can significantly bolster a symbolic convergence theory by understanding the way the social is responsible for the creation of all knowledge and therefore all symbolic material. This can free up the theory and the primary means for studying the theory (fantasy theme analysis) for use once again.
Preliminary Bibliography
Benoit, W. L., Klyukovski, A. A., McHale, J. P., & Airne, D. (2001). A fantasy-theme analysis
of political cartoons on the Clinton-Lewinsky-Starr affair. Critical Studies in Media
Communication, 18(4), 377-394.
Benoit, W. L., Klyukovski, A. A., McHale, J. P., & Airne, D. (2001). A fantasy-theme analysis
of political cartoons on the Clinton-Lewinsky-Starr affair. Critical Studies in Media
Communication, 18(4), 377-394.
Bormann, E. G., Cragan, J. F., & Shields, D. C. (2003). Defending symbolic convergence theory
from an imaginary Gunn. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 89(4), 366-372.
Bormann, G., Knutson, R. (2002). Why do people share fantasies? An empirical investigation of
a basic tenet of the symbolic. Communication Studies, 48(3), 254-276.
Bormann, E. G., Cragan, J. F., & Shields, D. C. (1996). An expansion of the rhetorical vision
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294.
Bormann, E. G. (1985a). The force of fantasy: Restoring the American dream. Illinois:
Southern Illinois University Press.
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Bormann, E. G. (1982). Fantasy and rhetorical vision: Ten years later. Quarterly Journal of
Speech, 68, 288-305.
Buber, M. (1970). I and thou. New York, NY: Charles Scribners’ Sons.
Durkheim, E. (1954). The elementary forms of religious life. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
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Fisher, Walter R. (1984) Narration as human communication paradigm: The case of public
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Gunn, J. (2003a). Refiguring fantasy: Imagination and its decline in U.S. rhetorical studies.
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 89(1), 41-59.
Gunn, J. (2003b). Response. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 89(4), 373-373.
Knuepper, C. & Anderson, F. (1980). Uniting wisdom and eloquence: the need for rhetorical
invention. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66(3), 313-326.
Larson, R. (1972). Some techniques for teaching rhetorical invention. Speech Teacher, 21(3),
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LeFevre, K. (1987). Invention as a social act. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
Mead, G. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Putnam, L., Van Hoeven, S., Bullis, C. (1991). The role of rituals and fantasy themes in teachers’
bargaining. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 55, 85-103.
St.Antoine, T. J., Althouse, M. T., & Ball, M. A. (2005). Fantasy-theme criticism. In J. A.
Kuypers (Ed.), The art of rhetorical criticism. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
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